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COLBY v. UNION SEC. INS. CO.: 
DEFINING THE RISK OF RELAPSE 
INTO SUBSTANCE ABUSE AS A 
CURRENT DISABILITY 
LINDSAY LOWE* 
In Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit considered whether the risk of relapse into substance abuse constitutes 
a current disability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).2  
The Court held that the risk of relapse into substance dependence is the same as a 
current disability.3  Based on this determination, the Court correctly concluded that 
the plaintiff was eligible for long-term benefits under an ERISA long-term 
disability plan.4  In addition, the Court aptly relied on expert testimony to 
determine the significance of a risk of relapse into substance dependence, finding 
the risk to be a current disability under the terms of the ERISA disability plan.5  
However, the Court’s narrow holding failed to address whether the risk of relapse 
constitutes a current disability under any circumstance.6  The First Circuit’s holding 
provides guidance on how other reviewing courts should analyze a plan 
administrator’s decisions,7 yet the majority fails to state whether reviewing courts 
should view the risk of relapse into substance dependence as equivalent to actual 
dependence. 8  
 
* JD Candidate, 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (Baltimore, 
MD).  BA, Political Science, 2012, Palm Beach Atlantic University (West Palm Beach, FL).  I 
would like to thank the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy’s editorial board and Ellen Weber 
for guiding me in developing this case note.  I would also like to thank my family and my friends 
for their great support and encouragement.  
 1. (Colby III), 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 2. Id. at 59–60. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. at 60 (holding that the plaintiff’s risk into substance abuse was a current disability 
deserving of long-term disability benefits).  See also infra Part IV.A (explaining why the Colby 
Court’s holding was correct). 
 5. See Colby III, 705 F.3d at 63–64 (discussing testimony from medical experts that strongly 
indicated that Dr. Colby was at a high risk of relapse and was “disabled for at least some period of 
time”). 
 6. See infra Part IV.B. 
 7. See infra Part IV.A. 
 8. See infra Part IV.C. 
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I.  THE CASE 
Beginning in the summer of 2000, Dr. Julie Colby, an anesthesiologist, 
experienced lower back pain and left leg numbness.9  Dr. Colby was diagnosed 
with a herniated disc.10  In 2001, Dr. Colby underwent a discectomy, the surgical 
removal of a herniated disc, to relieve the pain.11  The discectomy failed to relieve 
Dr. Colby of her pain, which led her to regularly self-medicate with Fentanyl, a 
Schedule II prescription drug Dr. Colby used to treat patients with severe back 
pain.12  Dr. Colby became “addicted to and dependent on Fentanyl.”13 
While on duty in July 2004, Dr. Colby was found sleeping or unconscious on 
a staff table in a hallway at Anna Jacques Hospital.14  At this time, Dr. Colby 
agreed to a requested urine drug screen, which tested positive for Fentanyl.15  
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Colby volunteered to give up her license to practice 
medicine.16 
On August 16, 2004, Dr. Colby enrolled in Talbott Recovery Campus 
(Talbott Recovery) in Atlanta, Georgia, an inpatient substance abuse treatment 
facility known for treating physicians.17  Dr. Colby also enrolled in a long-term 
disability plan with Union Security Insurance Company (USIC) around this time.18  
At Talbott Recovery, Dr. Colby was diagnosed with dysthymic disorder (also 
known as chronic depression), a history of major depressive disorder, and 
compulsive and avoidant personality traits in addition to her opioid dependency.19  
When Dr. Colby was discharged from Talbott Recovery on November 20, 
2004, USIC discontinued her long-term disability benefits.20  USIC claimed that 
Dr. Colby could not be afforded benefits for substance abuse where there was only 
 
 9. Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits (Colby I), 603 F.Supp.2d 223, 226 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 10. Id.  
 11. See id. (explaining that the discectomy enabled Dr. Colby to use her calf muscle, but it did 
not fully relieve Dr. Colby’s back and leg pain).     
 12. See id.  See also MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
fentanyl (defining Fentanyl as a “synthetic opioid narcotic analgesic”, similar to morphine, that is 
used in combination with other drugs in anesthesia); NAT’L INSTIT. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/fentanyl (describing Fentanyl as a schedule II prescription 
drug used to treat patients that experience chronic pain). 
 13. Colby I, 603 F.Supp.2d at 226. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits (Colby II), 818 F.Supp.2d 365, 370 (D. Mass. 2011), 
aff’d sub nom Colby III, 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 17. Colby I, 603 F.Supp.2d at 226.   
 18. See Colby II, 818 F.Supp.2d at 370.  The plan with USIC provided disability benefits 
where Dr. Colby was “unable to perform a material duty of her profession, including the ability to 
work full time.”  Colby I, 603 F.Supp.2d at 227. 
 19. See Colby I, 603 F.Supp.2d at 227. (discussing how Dr. Colby’s “physical and 
psychological intake exams” revealed various health problems, but Dr. Colby’s attendance at 
exercise programs and group meetings resulted in mental and physical health improvements).   
 20. Id. at 227–28. 
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a risk of relapse and not a current disability of active opioid dependency and 
abuse.21  Dr. Colby submitted two administrative appeals to USIC’s claim.22  Both 
of these administrative appeals were denied by USIC, exhausting Dr. Colby’s right 
to appeal under the terms of the disability plan.23  
After the denials, Dr. Colby filed suit in the United States District for the 
District of Massachusetts.24  USIC and Dr. Colby filed cross-motions for a 
“judgment based on the administrative record . . . and . . . agreed to permit the court 
to resolve their dispute.”25  The District Court ruled on the parties cross-motions, 
finding USIC’s termination of Dr. Colby’s long-term disability benefits to be 
unreasonable.26  Yet the court remanded the matter, asking USIC to “consider Dr. 
Colby’s risk of drug abuse relapse as a long-term disability if the risk is found to be 
sufficiently high.”27  
After considering the issue on remand, USIC denied Dr. Colby long-term 
disability benefits, finding that the risk of relapse was not [sufficiently high to 
constitute] a current disability under the insurance plan.28  Dr. Colby again 
appealed twice to the USIC board and was denied both times.29  In 2009, Dr. Colby 
“reopened the administratively closed case,” by suing in the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts.30  At this time, both USIC and Dr. Colby 
filed motions for summary judgment.31  The District Court granted Dr. Colby’s 
motion for summary judgment, awarding her long-term disability benefits.32  
USIC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
arguing that the risk of relapse was not a present disability that could afford 
benefits under the long-term plan.33  USIC contended that when Dr. Colby was 
released from Talbott Recovery, she “no longer had symptoms of active substance 
 
 21. Id. at 229. 
 22. See Colby I, 603 F.Supp.2d at 229–35 (discussing Dr. Colby’s two appeals, the 
information that Dr. Colby provided in support of the appeals, and the outcomes of the appeals).  
 23. See id. at 234. 
 24. See id. at 235. 
 25. Id.  
 26. See id. at 245–46 (finding USIC’s interpretation of the disability plan’s benefits to be 
arbitrary and capricious because USIC categorically excluded the risk of relapse as a current 
disability). 
 27. Colby II, 818 F.Supp.2d 365, 369 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d sub nom Colby III, 705 F.3d 58 
(1st Cir. 2013). 
 28. Id.  After USIC denied Dr. Colby’s claims, “USIC also concluded that Dr. Colby’s 
condition could be mitigated by a reasonable accommodation, precluding the need for LTD 
benefits.”  Id.  
 29. Id.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 30. See Colby II, 818 F.Supp.2d at 369. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 385.  
 33. See Colby III, 705 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing USIC’s argument that a risk of 
relapse is not a current disability, “no matter how grave”). 
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abuse,” and thus the risk of relapse was not the same as a current disability.34  On 
appeal, the First Circuit reviewed the USIC plan administrator’s decision to deny 
long-term disability benefits and addressed whether the risk of relapse into 
substance abuse is significant enough to constitute a current disability.35  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In recent years, the United States District Courts have differed on whether the 
risk of relapse constitutes a current disability under ERISA long-term disability 
plans.36  In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit created a 
circuit split as it sought to determine whether a plan administrator used reasonable 
discretion in declining long-term disability benefits for a risk of relapse into 
substance abuse.37  Part II.A of this Note discusses the deferential standard of 
review for ERISA cases, how the standard has evolved, and what courts must take 
into consideration when applying the standard.  Part II.B explains how, 
notwithstanding the standard of review, state and lower federal courts have adopted 
varying interpretations of what constitutes a current disability under ERISA long-
term disability plans.  
A. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
Courts operate more like appellate tribunals rather than trial courts when 
deciding ERISA cases.38  In an ERISA context, courts must “evaluate the 
reasonableness of an administrative determination in light of the record compiled 
before the plan fiduciary.”39  Courts are to apply a deferential standard of review, 
under which the plan administrator’s denial of benefits for the risk of relapse is 
assessed under an “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” standard.40  In 
evaluating whether the plan administrator’s determination is permissible under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard, courts should consider the plan administrator’s 
interpretation and application of the plan.41  
 
 34. Colby I, 603 F.Supp.2d 223, 226 (D. Mass 2009). 
 35. See Colby III, 705 F.3d at 59. 
 36. See infra Part II.B.  
 37. Colby III, 705 F.3d at 59–60.  
 38. See Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing the standard 
of review for ERISA cases, indicating that the district court “does not take evidence, but, rather, 
evaluates the reasonableness of an administrative determination in light of the record compiled 
before the plan fiduciary.”). 
 39. Id. at 18. 
 40. Wright v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons. Co. Grp. Benefits Plan, 402 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(citing Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
 41. See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 521 (2010) (acknowledging that where there is 
an unreasonable determination of plan benefits, courts applying the deferential standard of review 
consider the plan administrator’s interpretation of the plan). 
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1.  The Evolution of the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
In 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States in Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Bruch,42 determined the appropriate standard that reviewing courts must 
apply when evaluating a plan administrator’s benefit determination under ERISA.43  
The majority noted that ERISA did not establish a standard for courts reviewing 
“benefit eligibility determinations.”44  In order to fill this gap, the Court noted that 
most federal courts have applied the arbitrary and capricious standard.45  “[I]n light 
of Congress’ general intent to incorporate much of LMRA [Labor Management 
Relations Act] fiduciary law into ERISA, . . . and because ERISA, like the LMRA, 
imposes a duty of loyalty on fiduciaries and plan administrators, . . . LMRA 
arbitrary and capricious standard should apply to ERISA actions.”46  Yet, LMRA 
principles could not be adopted by ERISA, because unlike ERISA, LMRA does not 
authorize suits against fiduciaries and plan administrators to remedy violations.47  
Instead, the Court found that “a denial of benefits challenged under [an ERISA 
plan] is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the 
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for 
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”48  Thus, under Firestone, courts must 
provide a deferential standard of review where an ERISA plan administrator has 
discretionary authority.49 
In 1996, the Fourth Circuit in Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.,50 agreed that 
a plan administrator could be given “discretionary power.”51  “[W]hen the 
administrator’s exercise of a discretionary power forms the basis of a dispute 
between the parties, courts . . . decide only the contractual questions of whether the 
administrator exceeded its power or abused its discretion . . .”52  The Fourth Circuit 
 
 42. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).  In this case, Firestone refused to pay severance benefits to former 
employees with termination pay plans, under ERISA.  Id. at 106.  The District Court and the Court 
of Appeals applied different standards of review and issued different rulings on the interpretation 
of the plan.  Id. at 106–08.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriate 
standard of review.  Id. at 108. 
 43. Id. at 104–05. 
 44. Id. at 108–09. 
 45. See id. at 109 (explaining that the arbitrary and capricious standard was a “provision of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA)”).  See, e.g., Struble v. N. J. Brewery Emps.’ 
Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard comes from LMRA); Bayles v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F. 2d 
97, 99–100 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing the Court’s decision to apply the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, in the absence of a set ERISA standard of review).  
 46. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109.  See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 331–32 (1981) 
(discussing Congressional intent to incorporate LMRA law into ERISA). 
 47. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109–10. 
 48. Id. at 115.  
 49. Id.  
 50. 77 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 1996).  
 51. See id. at 88. 
 52. Id. 
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explained that “reviewing court[s] must also consider, to the extent relevant, (1) the 
scope of discretion conferred; (2) the purpose of the plan provision in which 
discretion is granted; (3) any external standard relevant to the exercise of that 
discretion; (4) the administrator’s motives; and (5) any conflict of interest under 
which the administrator operates in making its decision.”53  Thus, Haley provides 
reviewing courts with factors to consider when evaluating the plan administrator’s 
discretionary power.54 
In 2008, the Supreme Court in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn,55 recognized an 
additional factor to be considered in the arbitrary and capricious calculus under 
ERISA.56  The Court noted the conflict of interest inherent in the fact that the entity 
administering the long-term disability plan often “determines whether an employee 
is eligible for benefits and pays benefits out of its own pocket.”57  The Court 
determined that “this dual role creates a conflict of interest” given that the plan 
administrator stands to save itself money by finding the plan holder ineligible for 
long-term disability benefits.58  Consequently, in reviewing the reasonableness of 
an administrative determination, courts must consider the conflict of interest to be a 
factor in the arbitrary and capricious calculus.59  Additionally, the Court found that 
the significance of the conflict would depend on the circumstances of each case.60  
The Court reasoned that if a conflict of interest is present, “any one factor 
[including the conflict of interest] will act as a tiebreaker when the other factors are 
closely balanced, the degree of closeness necessary depending upon the tiebreaking 
factor’s inherent or case-specific importance.”61  Thus, under Glenn, courts 
determine whether a plan administrator’s decision is arbitrary and capricious on a 
case-by-case basis, incorporating conflict of interest as one factor.62  
 
 53. Id. at 89. 
 54. See id. 
 55. 554 U.S. 105 (2008). 
 56. See id. at 108.  In using the deferential standard of review, the Court found a conflict of 
interest existed where the entity administering the long-term disability plan determined the 
eligibility for benefits and paid the benefits.  Id. at 108;  see also id. at 112 (discussing how 
Firestone’s fourth principle refers to the conflict of interest that is created by a plan 
administrator’s dual role). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id.   
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. at 117 (discussing how circumstances of the conflict of interest may suggest a 
higher or lesser likelihood of affecting the benefits determination such as “where an insurance 
company administrator has a history of biased claims administration”).  
 61. Id.  
 62. See id. (“Benefits decisions arise in too many contexts, concern too many circumstances, 
and can relate in too many different ways to conflicts – which themselves vary in kind and in 
degree of seriousness – for us to come up with a one-size-fits-all procedural system that is likely 
to promote fair and accurate review.”). 
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In 2010, the Supreme Court in Conkright v. Frommert,63 reaffirmed the 
deferential standard of review for administrative decisions.64  Finding that the “one-
strike-and-you’re-out” approach to deferential review did not apply to courts 
reviewing ERISA cases,65 the Court determined that the plan administrator’s 
decision must be given deference whether or not the decision was the plan 
administrator’s “first efforts to construe the Plan.”66  The Court held that 
“[a]pplying a deferential standard of review does not mean that the plan 
administrator will prevail on the merits.  It means only that the plan administrator’s 
interpretation of the plan ‘will not be disturbed if reasonable.’”67  Thus, under 
Conkright, courts must solely use the deferential standard of review in ERISA 
cases where plan administrator’s use discretion.68  
In Hinkle ex. rel. Estate of Hinkle v. Assurant, Inc.,69 the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals explained that “where the courts of appeals are in disagreement on an 
issue, a decision one way or another cannot be regarded as arbitrary and 
capricious.”70  The Third Circuit reasoned that where there is a circuit split over the 
reasonableness of a plan administrator’s interpretation of the language of a specific 
insurance plan, district courts are only permitted to find the plan administrator’s 
interpretation to be reasonable,71 and may not conduct a review of the 
administrator’s decision.72  Thus, under Hinkle, a plan administrator’s decision 
should be reviewed with deference, as it cannot be regarded as arbitrary or 
capricious during a circuit split.73  
 
 
 63. 559 U.S. 506 (2010).  
 64. See id. at 512. 
 65. Id. at 513. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 521 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989)). 
 68. See id. at 521–22 (agreeing with the established standard in Firestone and Glenn that 
lower courts should defer to plan administrators except where a plan administrator abused her 
discretion). 
 69. 390 F. App’x 105 (3d Cir. 2010).  This is an unpublished opinion that was printed in the 
Federal Appendix, and pertained to courts experiencing a circuit split.  Id. at 108.  
 70. See id. (discussing how the Third Circuit permitted the plan administrator’s interpretation 
of accidental death where the courts of appeals were in disagreement on the issue of accidental 
death). 
 71. Id.; Colby II, 818 F.Supp.2d 365, 380 (D. Mass. 2011) aff’d sub nom Colby III, 705 F.3d 
58 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 72. See Hinkle, 390 F. App’x at 108 (discussing how courts are precluded from finding a plan 
administrator’s decision to be arbitrary or capricious). 
 73. See id. (explaining that when courts of appeals do not agree on an issue, decisions made 
by a plan one way or the other cannot be found arbitrary or capricious).  In applying Hinkle’s 
rationale, courts must use a very deferential standard of review that assumes the plan 
administrator’s decision is valid where a circuit split exists on the particular issue to be decided.  
Courts are not prone to adhere to Hinkle’s rationale, as it is an unpublished opinion. 
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B. Interpretation and Application of ERISA Long-Term Disability Plans 
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, courts must look to the plan 
administrator’s interpretation and application of the plan’s provisions to evaluate 
whether the plan administrator’s determinations are permissible.74  Three cases 
illustrate factors courts must consider when reviewing the interpretation and 
application of language found in an ERISA plan.  The first case, Harris v. Harvard 
Pilgrim Health Care, Inc.,75 explains the importance of understanding and 
administering the plain meaning of words used in the plan.76  Rodrigues-Abrue v. 
Chase Manhattan Bank77 and Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co.78 discuss how to interpret 
ambiguous plan language that cannot be plainly interpreted or applied.79 
In Harris, the First Circuit explained that ERISA’s main purpose is to “ensure 
the integrity and primacy of the written plans.”80  Hence, the Court reasoned, “the 
plain language of an ERISA plan must be enforced in accordance with ‘its literal 
and natural meaning.’”81  Similarly, in Rodrigues-Abrue, the First Circuit found 
that language in an ERISA plan must be given its plain meaning.82  Like the Harris 
and Rodrigues-Abrue Courts, courts traditionally refer to the plain meaning of 
language used in insurance plans.83   
The Rodrigues-Abrue Court recognized that there are instances where the 
plain meaning of a plan’s provisions cannot be interpreted or applied.84  The Court 
explained that a plan’s terms may be ambiguous when “the terms are inconsistent 
on their face, [and] . . . allow reasonable but differing interpretations of their 
meaning.”85  According, the First Circuit found that where the plan’s provisions are 
ambiguous, courts must turn to “surrounding circumstances [and] undisputed 
extrinsic evidence.”86  Thus, under Rodrigues-Abrue, courts must determine 
 
 74. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that courts must evaluate the 
reasonableness of the plan administrator’s determination). 
 75. 208 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 76. See id. at 277–78 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing United McGill Corp. v. Stinnett, 154 F.3d 168, 
172 (4th Cir. 1998)) (discussing how the plain language of a plan must be enforced in accordance 
with the “literal and natural meaning” of the plan’s language). 
 77. 986 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 78. 514 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 79. See Stanford, 514 F.3d at 357 (finding that courts must consider the plain language of the 
plan and whether the plan contains ambiguous language); Rodrigues-Abrue, 986 F.2d at 586. 
 80. See Harris, 208 F.3d at 277–78. 
 81. Id. (quoting United McGill Corp. v. Stinnett, 154 F. 3d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 82. Rodrigues-Abrue, 986 F.2d at 586 (citing Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 873 
F.2d 486, 489 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
 83. See id.; Harris, 208 F.3d at 277–78 (finding that contract language in ERISA plans must 
be given plain meaning).  See, e.g., Brazas Sporting Arms, Inc. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. 
Co., 220 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that traditional rules of contract interpretation are 
used for ERISA plans). 
 84. Rodrigues-Abrue, 986 F.2d at 586.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
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whether the language can be construed plainly or if it is ambiguous.87  If the 
language is ambiguous, courts must consider the surrounding circumstances and 
undisputed extrinsic evidence to interpret and apply the language of the ERISA 
plan.88  
In addressing ambiguous language, the Fourth Circuit in Stanford affirmed 
the holding in Rodrigues-Abrue.89  The Fourth Circuit asserted that reviewing 
courts must find substantial evidence to support an ambiguity in the plan’s 
provisions.90  The Court explained that there must be a “sliding scale according to 
which the plan administrator’s decision must be more objectively reasonable and 
supported by more substantial evidence as the incentive for abuse of discretion is 
shown to increase.”91  Yet, in Stanford, the Court held that every ambiguity cannot 
be found in the plan holder’s favor.92  The Court reasoned that reviewing courts 
must remember to give the plan administrator discretion when interpreting and 
applying ambiguous language.93  Thus, under Stanford, courts must continue to 
apply the arbitrary and capricious standard when there is ambiguity in a plan’s 
provision.94 
C.  Additional Considerations for Reviewing Courts 
Following review of the plan administrator’s interpretation and application of 
an ERISA plan, courts are to consider whether the plan administrator’s denial of 
benefits was “reasoned and supported by substantial evidence”95 that is “sufficient 
to support a conclusion.”96  For example, in Gannon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., the 
First Circuit explained that the existence of contrary evidence does not mean that a 
plan administrator’s decision is automatically arbitrary and will not be upheld.97  
Even when there is contrary evidence, substantial evidence may nonetheless 
 
 87. See id. (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Singh, 977 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
 88. See id. (citing Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 89. See Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that where 
there is a contact ambiguity, the court must determine the plan administrator’s decision to be 
supported by more substantial evidence that shows there was no abuse of discretion). 
 90. See id. at 357. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. (“[T]the reduced deference standard does not require the reviewing court to 
construe every contract ambiguity in favor of the claimant.”). 
 93. See id. (noting that if the court was required to construe every contract ambiguity in favor 
of the claimant, then the provision granting the plan administrator discretion would be erased). 
 94. See id. (finding that even where there is a contract ambiguity, and a conflict of interest 
such as “when a benefit plan is administered and funded by the same party,” the plan 
administrator is entitled to some deference). 
 95. Gannon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 211, 213 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Vlass v. 
Raytheon Employees Disability Trust, 244 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
 96. Id. at 213. 
 97. 360 F.3d 211, 213 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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support a conclusion that the Court held.98  In this case, the First Circuit considered 
medical records, medical opinions, surveillance reports, and other expert 
evaluations to be substantial evidence.99  In the aggregate, the First Circuit found 
this evidence was substantial enough to support a conclusion in this instant case.100  
Adopting the reasoning set forth in Gannon, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Michigan in Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co.,101 
agreed that “extensive medical evidence, treatment records, and the opinions of 
plaintiff’s physicians” is substantial evidence that supports a conclusion.102  The 
Kufner Court found that the reviewing court and the plan administrator must take 
this evidence into account when applying the plan’s provisions.103  The Court 
reasoned that where the plan administrator ignored substantial evidence, the 
administrator’s decision can be deemed arbitrary and capricious for abuse of 
discretion.104  In the case at issue here, the First Circuit found that the plan 
administrator’s decision “lack[ed] a credible basis for denying benefits.”105  Thus, 
under Kufner, reviewing courts must locate any substantial evidence and ensure 
that the plan administrator has taken this evidence into account.106 
D. State and Lower Federal Courts Adopted Varying Interpretations of a 
Current Disability 
Various state and lower federal courts have issued differing opinions on 
whether ERISA plan administrators have reasonably determined if the risk of 
relapse into substance abuse is equal to a current disability that is deserving of 
long-term disability benefits.107  When evaluating a plan administrator’s decision 
for denial of benefits, reviewing courts must not only apply the arbitrary and 
capricious standard, courts must also consider the meaning of a risk of relapse into 
 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 213–14. 
 100. See id. at 213–16.  Here, the Court found that “in the presence of conflicting evidence, it 
is entirely appropriate for a reviewing court to uphold the decision of the entity entitled to exercise 
its discretion.” Id. at 216. 
 101. 595 F.Supp.2d 785 (W.D. Mich. 2009).  
 102. See id. at 797 (identifying substantial evidence that supported the conclusion that the 
plaintiff’s probability of relapsing was high enough to justify a disability, under the insurance 
plan). 
 103. See id. (determining that the plan administrator’s decision did not result from a “deliberate 
principled reasoning process,” and was not “supported by substantial evidence”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. (finding the plan administrator’s decision to deny the plaintiff benefits was 
unreasonable because the plan administrator failed to conduct a proper review of the plan and 
substantial extrinsic evidence provided by the plaintiff). 
 106. See id. (noting that where the plan administrator fails to take substantial evidence into 
account, the administrator’s decision may constitute an abuse of discretion). 
 107. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing courts that defined the risk of relapse as a current 
disability and courts that declined to define the risk of relapse as a current disability). 
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substance abuse.108  Hence, the consideration of the risk of relapse is contingent on 
a court’s interpretation of the language found in a long-term disability plan.109  
State and lower federal courts adopted varying interpretations of whether a risk of 
relapse into substance abuse constitutes a current disability based on the plan 
administrator’s interpretation, disability claims, and medical evidence of the 
disability.110  As a result, the courts are split.111  Some state and lower federal 
courts find a risk of relapse into substance abuse to constitute a current disability,112 
while others do not.113   
1.  Courts Defining the Risk of Relapse as a Current Disability 
Some state and lower federal courts reasoned that a risk of relapse into 
substance abuse constitutes a current disability under an ERISA long-term 
disability plan.114  For example, in Price v. Disability, RMS,115 the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts explained, “that the risk that a 
recovering substance abuser may relapse would be sufficient to support a finding of 
total disability as defined in the Policy.”116  Yet, in Price, the District Court held 
that there was no substantial evidence that supported a finding of a current 
disability.117  Thus, the Court merely recognized that a risk of relapse into 
substance abuse could constitute a current disability where there is evidence to 
support this conclusion.118   
Similarly, in Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Michigan explained that extensive evidence 
indicated that the risk of relapse constituted a current disability under an ERISA 
long-term disability plan.119  The District Court found that a plan administrator’s 
 
 108. See Colby I, 603 F.Supp.2d 223, 241–42 (D. Mass. 2009) (stating that courts should take 
into consideration any evidence that indicates whether an individual’s risk of relapse is a 
“disabling sickness” under a long-term disability plan). 
 109. See infra Part II.B.1 (showing that courts adopted varying interpretations of whether a risk 
of relapse constituted a current disability). 
 110. See infra Part II.B.1 
 111. Colby III, 705 F.3d 58, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 112. See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
 113. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 114. See Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F.Supp.2d 785, 797 (W.D. Mich. 2009) 
(awarding the plaintiff disability benefits where a plan administrator’s denial of benefits was 
arbitrary and capricious); Price v. Disability RMS, No. 06-10251-GAO, 2008 WL 763255, at *21 
(D. Mass. 2008) (recognizing that the risk of relapse constitutes a current disability, even though 
the plaintiff’s claim did not meet the standard for a current disability). 
 115. 2008 WL 763255.  
 116. Id. at *21. 
 117. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff’s risk of relapse was only identified in general terms, 
without specific data that supported the plaintiff’s circumstances).  
 118. See id. (showing that if the plaintiff’s record supported his claim for risk of relapse, then 
the risk could constitute a current disability).   
 119. Kufner, 595 F.Supp.2d 785, 795–97 (W.D. Mich. 2009).  
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denial of continuing long-term disability benefits to Ronald Kufner, an opioid and 
alcohol-dependent anesthesiologist, was an abuse of discretion.120  The Kufner 
Court reasoned that there was extensive evidence presented to support the disability 
claim, as well as case-specific factors such as “the nature of the evidence, conflict 
of interest, and public health and safety.”121  The plan administrator received 
extensive evidence showing the risk of relapse “remained a lifelong issue” for 
Ronald Kufner.122  Yet, the plan administrator did not take this extensive evidence 
into consideration when making a disability benefits determination.123  Therefore, 
the Kufner Court concluded that the plan administrator’s decision did not result 
“from a ‘deliberate principled reasoning process,’” or was “‘supported by 
substantial evidence.’”124  
2.  Courts Declining to Define the Risk of Relapse as a Current Disability  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Stanford v. 
Cont’l Cas. Co., reasoned that a risk of relapse into substance abuse does not 
constitute a current disability under an ERISA long-term disability plan.125  Thus, 
individuals that have a potential risk of relapse into substance abuse are excluded 
from receiving the benefits of a long-term disability plan.126  The Fourth Circuit 
explained that a plan administrator’s denial of long-term disability benefits was 
reasonable where a nurse practitioner, who was addicted to Fentanyl, risked 
relapsing into substance abuse.127  Robert Stanford, the nurse practitioner, enrolled 
 
 120. See id. at 788, 792. 
 121. See id. at 792.  The court used the evidence that was presented to determine whether the 
plan administrator interpreted the disability plan and the plaintiff’s disability claim reasonably.  
See id. at 797.  “Weighing the record and the factors involved in the benefits determination, the 
Court concludes that defendant abused its discretion in disregarding plaintiff's evidence and 
opinions in favor of the "independent" opinions secured by defendant, from physicians who are 
less qualified on addiction issues and less familiar with plaintiff's medical treatment.”  Id. 
 122. See id. at 794–95.  The plan administrator reviewed extensive evidence provided by 
medical experts, before the denial of benefits occurred.  See id. at 794. “Defendant's initial denial 
was based on a review of medical records and opinions submitted by plaintiff. Defendant 
subsequently secured opinions from Dr. Gratzer and Dr. Goldman, which defendant ultimately 
relied on in denying plaintiff's claim for LTD.” Id. 
 123. See id. at 792. 
 124. Id. at 797.  
 125. See Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 361 (4th Cir. 2008). But see id. 
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s holding was based on two abstractions that 
are not grounded in the law: (1) the disability plan does not have to cover a risk of relapse, and (2) 
the risk of relapse is different than physical illnesses like a heart attack). 
 126. See id. at 361 (majority opinion) (explaining that the risk of relapse is “not a form of 
disability under the benefit plan”). 
 127. See id. at 361; see also id. at 355 (explaining how “Stanford [who was] a trained nurse 
anesthetist, a health care professional responsible for administering anesthesia to patients 
undergoing surgical and obstetric procedures,” began to self-administer Fentanyl, and became 
addicted to the drug by September 2003). 
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into treatment programs three times and relapsed twice.128  When Stanford 
completed the third treatment program, the plan administrator terminated 
Stanford’s disability benefits.129  The Fourth Circuit contended that the plan 
administrator’s denial of benefits was not arbitrary or capricious.130  Reasoning that 
substance abuse is a choice and not a disability, the Stanford Court concluded that 
“whether [the nurse practitioner] succumbs to that temptation [of relapsing in 
substance abuse] remains his choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such 
choice.”131   
In Stanford, the Fourth Circuit determined that the risk of relapse into 
substance abuse was unlike the risk of recurrence of a heart attack.132  This 
conclusion relied on the distinction between the origins of the risks of these two 
conditions.133  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that:  
[a] doctor with a heart condition who enters a high-stress environment 
like an operating room “risks relapse” in the sense that the performance 
of his job duties may cause a heart attack[;] . . . but an anesthetist with 
a drug addiction who enters an environment where drugs are readily 
available “risks relapse” only in the sense that the ready availability of 
drugs increases his temptation to resume his drug use.134   
Consistent with this reasoning, the Court asserted that the individual facing a risk 
of relapse into substance abuse has a choice to make, where the individual facing a 
risk of another heart attack has no choice.135  Hence, the Fourth Circuit held that a 
risk of relapse into substance abuse is not a current disability.  In holding that the 
risk of relapse into substance abuse was not a current disability under ERISA,136 the 
Fourth Circuit established a categorical exclusion.137  The Court recognized “that 
this creates a somewhat troubling – some might say perverse – incentive structure: 
an addict who continues to abuse drugs will be entitled to long-term benefits, but 
upon achieving sobriety will lose those benefits unless he again begins to abuse 
drugs.”138  Yet, the Fourth Circuit found that where there is a risk of relapse into 
 
 128. See id. at 356. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. at 361. 
 131. Id. at 358. 
 132. Id. at 358. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 135. See id. (discussing how the risk of relapse into substance abuse is not the same as the risk 
of a reoccurring heart attack, because the risk of relapse involves the choice to avoid temptation). 
 136. Id. at 361. 
 137. See id. (finding that where the disability plan contains no language concerning the risk of 
relapse, the Fourth Circuit has permitted a plan administrator’s decision to exclude the potential 
risk). 
 138. Id. at 359.  
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substance abuse, there is no current disability.139  Thus, the individual prone to 
relapse into substance abuse does not qualify for long-term disability benefits.140   
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, holding that the risk of relapse into substance abuse is 
significant enough to be a current disability.141  In so holding, the First Circuit 
concluded that Dr. Colby had a current disability that qualified for disability 
benefits, and therefore USIC acted unreasonably in terminating Dr. Colby’s long-
term disability benefits.142  
According to the majority, in order to determine whether Dr. Colby had a 
current disability that qualified for disability benefits, the court had to assess the 
reasonableness of USIC’s termination of Dr. Colby’s benefits based on the 
arbitrary and capricious standard.143  The Colby Court acknowledged that the main 
issue on appeal was whether USIC exercised reasonable discretion when it 
terminated Dr. Colby’s benefits, finding that the risk of relapse was not a current 
disability.144   
In deciding the case, the First Circuit examined Dr. Colby’s claim for long-
term disability benefits with regard to her risk of relapse into substance abuse.145  
First, the Court assessed Dr. Colby’s long-term disability benefits plan to determine 
whether Dr. Colby’s claim for disability benefits was supported by the plan.146  
Upon completing this assessment, the Court found that Dr. Colby’s plan included 
an occupation test.147  This test covered injury and sickness, and “require[d] a 
claimant to ‘be under the regular care and attendance of a doctor, and [have a 
condition that] prevents [her] from performing at least one of the material duties of 
[her] regular occupation.’”148  According to this test, the Court must evaluate Dr. 
Colby’s ability to perform at least one of the material duties of her job as a 
physician.149  This evaluation of whether Dr. Colby could complete her job as a 
 
 139. Id. at 360.  
 140. See id. at 358. 
 141. Colby III, 705 F.3d 58, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 142. See id. at 68. 
 143. See id. at 59–60. 
 144. See id. at 61 (explaining that the court must show deference when reviewing whether the 
USIC plan administrator appropriately used her discretion in the interpretation and application of 
the plan). 
 145. See id. at 62. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. (indicating that coverage under the occupational test applies to the “first 36 months 
of a period of disability, subsequent to a 90-day waiting period”). 
 149. See id. 
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physician consisted of a number of factors, including Dr. Colby’s ability to work 
full-time, Dr. Colby’s medical records and reports, and a medical expert’s opinion 
and diagnosis of Dr. Colby’s conditions.150  
The First Circuit considered Dr. Colby’s risk of relapse in light of the plan’s 
occupation test.151  The Court recognized that substance abuse, substance 
dependence, and substance addiction are like mental illnesses and constitute 
sickness under the plan’s terms.152  Dr. Colby “suffered from opioid dependence 
and addiction, . . . and faced such a significant risk of relapse that she could not 
perform one or more of the material duties of her customary occupation.”153  The 
Court explained that Dr. Colby’s risk of substance abuse was likely to become a 
“sickness” because of Dr. Colby’s occupation and her access to the drug of her 
choice.154  Dr. Colby was a physician that worked with opioids and was exposed to 
other substances that attributed to a higher risk of substance abuse.155  Additionally, 
the Colby Court noted that there were other conditions that could trigger Dr. 
Colby’s tendency to use opioids, such as her continual back pain, various mental 
disorders, and stressors from her personal life.156  Thus, under the occupation test, 
the First Circuit contended that Dr. Colby would be unable to perform one or more 
of her material duties as a physician because her occupation attributed to a 
heightened risk of relapse into substance abuse.157  
In determining whether Dr. Colby’s high risk of relapsing into opioid 
dependency constituted a sickness under the plan’s occupation test, the First Circuit 
further considered Dr. Colby’s medical records and reports, and any medical 
expert’s opinion on Dr. Colby’s condition.158  The Court explained “[Dr. Colby’s] 
record reflects that, due largely to risk of relapse, a number of medical experts 
agreed that [Dr. Colby] remained disabled159 for at least some period of 
time . . . .”160  The Colby Court also stated that “a number of allied professionals 
 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 62–63.  
 154. Id.  
 155. See id. at 63 (explaining that even though there was conflicting evidence, “the record 
generally suggests that the plaintiff was at a high risk of relapse into opioid dependence following 
her discharge from inpatient care”). 
 156. Id.  
 157. See id.  
 158. See id. at 62–63 (explaining that Dr. Colby’s therapist, Dell-Ross, predicted that if Dr. 
Colby returned to work, her “access to opiates, . . . combined with the usual and unusual stressors 
of everyday life and work would make her relapse almost inevitable”). 
 159. See id. (stating that experts found to the term “disabled” to mean that Dr. Colby faced a 
high risk of relapse where she “could not perform one or more of the material duties of her 
customary occupation”).   
 160. Id. at 63–64.  Dr. Alan A. Wartenberg wrote: “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
Dr. Colby is at high risk of relapse should she return to the practice of anesthesia, or to any 
situation where she could access anesthetic opioids.”  Id. at 64.  Dr. Marcus J. Goldman wrote: 
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agreed with these assessments.”161  This extensive evidence indicated that Dr. 
Colby was indeed at a “very significant risk of relapse” and that she lacked the 
“functional capacity for returning to work,” the Court concluded.162  
After reviewing whether Dr. Colby’s condition met the plan’s occupation test, 
the Court evaluated USIC’s termination of Dr. Colby’s benefits.163  The First 
Circuit noted that USIC “took a categorical approach, steadfastly maintaining that 
risk of relapse, whatever the degree, could not constitute a current disability under 
the plan.”164  Yet, the Court explained that “the defense is not viable in this case: 
given the language of the plan, categorically excluding risk of relapse as a source of 
disability is simply unreasonable.”165  The plain language of the plan “admits . . . 
no such categorical bar”, the Court stated.166  Recognizing that the plan made no 
mention of the risk of relapse, the Court determined that there was no per se 
exclusion of risk of relapse within the terms of the plan.167  The First Circuit 
determined that there was no basis for reading an exclusion for risk of relapse into 
the plan.168  
Following this, the Court mentioned Judge Wilkinson’s dissenting opinion in 
Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,169 where it previously held that a risk of relapse into 
substance abuse does not constitute a current disability under an ERISA long-term 
disability plan.170  The Court agreed with the dissenting opinion, finding that “to 
relapse into addiction or lose . . . benefits would thwart the very purpose for which 
disability plans exist: to help people overcome medical adversity if possible, and 
otherwise to cope with it.”171  Furthermore, the First Circuit reasoned that USIC’s 
 
“the plaintiff had psychiatric functional incapacity from July 2004 through the end of 2005 and 
that her “risk of relapse . . . was significant.”  Id.  Dr. William B. Land wrote: “the combination of 
psychiatric and physical conditions [including opioid dependence] rendered her unable to perform 
duties not only of an anesthesiologist, but also for a physician generally given the access to 
opioids.”  Id.  Dr. Land also stated that Dr. Colby “appeared to have numerous psychosocial 
stressors which would have precipitated a relapse.”  Id. 
 161. See id. at 64 (discussing additional views of experts who agree that Dr. Colby’s risk of 
relapse is significant).  For example, Dr. Milton Jay, Ed. D., wrote: “[Dr. Colby had a] moderate 
severity relapse profile.”  Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. (discussing how USIC’s initial motion for judgment suggested that “a mere risk of 
relapse into a prior, self-controlled condition is not . . . [a] condition that would preclude [Dr. 
Colby] from working in her occupation”). 
 164. Id. at 64. 
 165. Id. at 65.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. See id. (discussing how USIC determined a risk of relapse to be “a speculative future 
possibility” and not a present risk, refusing to consider whether Dr. Colby’s risk of relapse was a 
present disability). 
 169. See id. at 66 (agreeing with Judge Wilkinson’s dissenting opinion in Stanford that “there 
is no basis for importing an unwritten textual exclusion for risk of relapse into the plan”). 
 170. See Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 360–61 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 171. Colby III, 705 F.3d at 66 (quoting Stanford, 514 F.3d at 362) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
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termination of Dr. Colby’s long-term disability benefits created a “perverse 
incentive” where Dr. Colby was permitted to receive benefits if she relapsed into 
substance abuse.172  
The First Circuit in Colby concluded that “without such a written exclusion in 
place, we believe USIC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing to consider 
whether [Dr. Colby’s] risk of relapse swelled to the level of a disability.”173  The 
Court noted that its holding was based on the arbitrary and capricious standard, 
granting discretion to USIC’s denial of long-term disability benefits.174  Thus, the 
First Circuit narrowly held that Dr. Colby’s risk of relapse into substance abuse is 
significant enough to be a current disability, in light of the particular facts of the 
case and the terms of her benefit plan.175  Finding USIC’s categorical approach 
inapplicable to this case, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts by applying a case-by-case 
approach, permitting long-term disability benefits for the risk of relapse given the 
specific facts of Dr. Colby’s case.176  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit accurately held that the risk of relapse into substance abuse constituted 
a current disability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA).177  The First Circuit’s holding provided a clear standard of review for 
reviewing courts to employ when determining whether the risk of relapse is a 
condition that may constitute a long-term disability.178  In its opinion, the Court 
adhered to the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing the plan 
administrator’s decision, finding that a categorical exclusion cannot be written into 
the plan’s provisions where that language is absent.179  The First Circuit correctly 
relied on expert testimony to determine the significance of a risk of relapse into 
 
 172. Id.  The court in Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co. agreed with this statement, finding 
that “unless and until …an actual relapse of narcotics addiction [occurs] . . . is untenable given the 
serious risk this poses to public health and safety.”  595 F.Supp.2d 785, 796 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 
 173. Colby III, 705 F.3d at 67. 
 174. See id.   
 175. See id. 
 176. Id. at 67.  The First Circuit recognized that its holding permits long-term disability 
benefits for the risk of relapse, where the Fourth Circuit has denied these benefits.   See id.  “We 
are keenly aware that the only court of appeals to have considered this precise issue has – albeit in 
a two-to-one decision – reached a contrary conclusion.”  See id.; Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 
F.3d 354, 360–61 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 177. See Colby III, 705 F.3d at 59–60. 
 178. See id. at 65–66. 
 179. See id. at 65. 
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substance dependence, finding the risk sufficiently acute to constitute a current 
disability under the terms of the ERISA disability plan.180  
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the First Circuit’s decision was accurate, as it was 
grounded in the traditional arbitrary and capricious calculus that included the 
consideration of evidence from medical experts.181  Even so, the First Circuit failed 
to address whether the risk of relapse constitutes a current disability under any 
circumstance.182  While the Court’s decision to define the risk of relapse as a 
current disability furthers the argument that the risk of relapse is the same as a risk 
of mental illness,183 the Court did not address how other reviewing courts should 
view the nature of the risk of relapse when determining if the risk is a current 
disability.184  Furthermore, the Colby opinion did not clearly state what bridged the 
gap between risk of relapse and actual substance abuse.185  The First Circuit should 
have adopted a bright-line rule to address instances where a certain disability, like a 
risk of relapse into substance abuse, is not included in a disability plan’s plain 
language.   
A. The Court’s Ruling was Grounded in the Traditional Arbitrary and 
Capricious Calculus 
In Colby, the First Circuit properly adhered to the arbitrary and capricious 
standard when it assessed the reasonableness of the plan administrator’s 
termination of the plaintiff’s disability benefits under her ERISA plan.186  First the 
Court examined the plaintiff’s claim for long-term disability benefits by assessing 
the extent of her risk of relapse into substance abuse. 187  Next, the Court analyzed 
whether the claim for disability benefits was supported by the plan.188  It found that 
the plaintiff’s plan included an occupation test that consisted of a number of 
 
 180. See id. at 63–64 (discussing how the court considered Dr. Colby’s therapist’s opinion and 
diagnosis, as well as the view of medical experts, when evaluating the plan administrator’s 
decision).  See supra notes 160–64 and accompanying text. 
 181. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how the First Circuit’s decision was grounded in the 
traditional arbitrary and capricious calculus). 
 182. See infra Part IV.B. 
 183. See Colby III, 705 F.3d at 62 (recognizing that if the risk of relapse constituted a current 
disability under the plan’s occupation test, it would give rise to sickness like a mental illness). 
 184. See infra Part IV.C (discussing how the First Circuit did not provide guidance to other 
reviewing courts that will determine whether the risk of relapse is the same as an actual substance 
dependence, which is a current disability that can be afforded benefits under an ERISA plan’s 
occupation test). 
 185. See infra Part IV.C (discussing how the risk of relapse into substance dependence was not 
included in the plan’s language as a disability that could constitute benefits, yet the First Circuit 
found that the risk of relapse was a current disability, like actual substance dependence). 
 186. See Colby III, 705 F.3d at 61 (noting that the standard of review was deferential). 
 187. See id. at 62. 
 188. Id. 
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factors, including the plaintiff’s ability to work full-time,189 the plaintiff’s ability to 
assess patient’s medical records and reports, and a medical expert’s opinion and 
diagnosis of the plaintiff’s conditions.190  
After reviewing the plaintiff’s claim under the plan’s occupation test, the First 
Circuit evaluated the plan administrator’s termination of the plaintiff’s benefits.191  
It found that the plan administrator “took a categorical approach, steadfastly 
maintaining that risk of relapse, whatever the degree, could not constitute a current 
disability under the plan.”192  Additionally, the Court determined that it was 
unreasonable for the plan administrator to categorically exclude the risk of relapse 
where the plain language of the plaintiff’s plan “admits . . . no such categorical 
bar.”193  Since the plaintiff’s plan made no mention of the risk of relapse, there 
could be no exclusion for the risk within the terms of the plan.194  Thus, the First 
Circuit concluded that there was no basis for implying a categorical exclusion for 
the risk of relapse into substance abuse.195   
Conversely, in Stanford, the Fourth Circuit held that the plan administrator 
could categorically exclude the plaintiff’s risk of relapse from coverage where the 
plaintiff’s disability plan made no mention of the risk.196  In evaluating the 
plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits, the Fourth Circuit determined whether the 
claim was supported by the plan’s occupation test.197  Following application of the 
plan’s occupation test, the plaintiff’s ability to perform at least one of the material 
duties of the plaintiff’s occupation, in light of the plaintiff’s risk of relapse into 
substance abuse was considered.198  Yet, the Fourth Circuit did not consider a 
medical expert’s opinion and diagnosis of the plaintiff’s conditions.199  
In Stanford the Fourth Circuit contended that the plan administrator’s 
decision that a “risk of relapse was not a form of disability under the benefit plan 
was reasonable, even if strong arguments exist to the contrary; its failure to consult 
with a health care professional in making that determination was not improper 
 
 189. See id. (explaining that working full-time meant Dr. Colby worked at least forty-five 
hours per week). 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at 64–65. 
 192. Id. at 64.  
 193. Id. at 65. 
 194. Id.   
 195. Id. at 66. 
 196. Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 361 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 197. Id. at 357–58. 
 198. See id. at 358–59 (explaining that the plaintiff was capable of performing his former 
occupation because he was not physically or mentally disabled, but his license dictated that he 
could not return). 
 199. Id. at 360 (noting that the “determination that such a risk of relapse did not fall within the 
benefit plan’s definition of ‘disability’” was based on an analysis that was “purely contractual, not 
medical.”). 
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since the decision was contractual rather than medical.”200  Unlike the First Circuit, 
the Fourth Circuit in Stanford incorrectly permitted the plan administrator to write 
in an exclusion for the risk of relapse when the plan itself did not include such an 
exclusion.201  The Fourth Circuit also failed to examine evidence provided by 
medical experts about the plaintiff’s condition, and his ability to perform the duties 
of his occupation.202  In making its determination, the Fourth Circuit did not follow 
the arbitrary and capricious calculus for the plan’s occupation test, which indicates 
that Courts should consider “aggregate evidence” when reviewing a plan 
administrator’s decision.203  Additionally, the Court permitted the plan 
administrator to write in a categorical exclusion and glossed over the fact that there 
was no plan provision addressing risk of relapse.204  Thus, the Fourth Circuit based 
its decision on a faulty premise, as it was not grounded in the traditional standard of 
review like the First Circuit’s decision.205  
B. While the Court’s Ruling Was Accurate, it Failed to Address  
Whether a Risk of Relapse into Substance Abuse is a  
Current Disability Under Any Circumstance 
In Colby, the First Circuit correctly concluded that the risk of relapse into 
substance abuse was the same as a current disability under the standard supplied by 
the plaintiff’s ERISA long-term disability benefits plan.206  Rather than addressing 
the issue of whether a risk of relapse constitutes a current disability, the court 
focused on whether the risk of relapse constituted a current disability under the 
narrowly-tailored provisions of the plaintiff’s long-term disability plan.207  
The First Circuit narrowly focused on the provisions of the plaintiff’s ERISA 
long-term disability plan.208  The plan’s provisions included an occupation test, 
which covered injury and sickness, and “require[d] a claimant to ‘be under the 
regular care and attendance of a doctor, and prevents [the claimant] from 
 
 200. Id. at 361. 
 201. Colby III, 705 F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir. 2013).  See Stanford, 514 F.3d at 361 (discussing the 
Fourth Circuit’s holding that the risk of relapse into substance abuse does not constitute a current 
disability under an ERISA long-term disability plan). 
 202. See Stanford, 514 F.3d at 361 (holding that “continental did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Stanford’s long term disability benefits,” and that “failure to consult with a health care 
professional . . . was not improper.”). 
 203. See Colby I, 603 F.Supp.2d 223, 226 (D. Mass. 2009) (quoting Wright v. R.R. Donnelley 
& Sons. Co. Group Benefits Plan, 402 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir.2005)) (finding that “The operative 
inquiry under arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion review is ‘whether the aggregate 
evidence . . . could support a rational determination that the plan administrator acted arbitrarily in 
denying the claim for benefits.’’’)).  See also Stanford, 514 F.3d at 361 (showing that the court did 
not consult medical experts when evaluating the plan administrator’s decision).  
 204. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 205. Id. at 361 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).  
 206. Colby III, 705 F.3d at 59–60. 
 207. See id. at 67 (acknowledging that the court’s holding is narrow). 
 208. Id. at 62. 
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performing at least one of the material duties of [her] regular occupation.’”209  The 
occupation test required the court to evaluate Dr. Colby’s ability to perform at least 
one of the material duties of her job as a physician.210  The Court referred to the 
plan’s occupation test to determine whether Dr. Colby’s claim for disability 
benefits was supported by the plan.211  
In making its decision, the Court’s evaluation consisted of a number of 
factors, including Dr. Colby’s ability to work full-time, Dr. Colby’s ability to 
review her patient’s medical records and reports, and a medical expert’s opinion 
and diagnosis of Dr. Colby’s conditions.212  All of these factors pertained solely to 
the plaintiff, Dr. Colby.213  The holding specifically addressed Dr. Colby’s 
disability benefits claim, and Dr. Colby’s risk of relapse.214  However, the First 
Circuit failed to address whether a risk of relapse into substance abuse can 
constitute a current disability under any circumstance.215  The Court should have 
gone further and addressed the central issue that is before the Courts of Appeals, to 
determine whether a risk of relapse may constitute a current disability regardless of 
the terms of an individual’s specific disability plan. 
C. While the Court’s Ruling Was Accurate, it Failed  
        to Provide a Remedy for the Major Issue at Hand 
The First Circuit’s holding provides guidance on how other reviewing courts 
should review plan administrator’s decisions. 216  However, the opinion fails to 
provide clear guidance on how reviewing courts should view the nature of the risk 
of relapse into substance dependence when deciding if the risk is the same as an 
actual dependence.217  Only one other United States Court of Appeals has ruled on 
whether the risk of relapse into substance abuse constitutes a current disability: the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Stanford, holding a contrary ruling to the 
First Circuit.218  Hence, the First Circuit’s decision in Colby creates a circuit 
split.219  The First Circuit, the most recent court to rule on this issue, has not made 
it easy on its fellow courts reviewing whether a risk of relapse constitutes a current 
 
 209. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id.  
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. at 62. 
 214. See id. at 67. 
 215. See id. (explaining that the Court’s holding was narrow). 
 216. See id. at 65–66 (explaining that the court evaluated the plan administrator’s decision to 
terminate benefits by following the arbitrary and capricious calculus, assessing the plain language 
of the disability plan, interpreting the plan’s occupation test, and considering the evidence 
provided by medical experts). 
 217. See id. at 67 (noting that the majority’s holding is narrowly focused). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 59–60. 
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disability220 because it did not clearly address how courts should view the risk of 
relapse into substance abuse.221  Although the Court considered the occupation test 
under the plaintiff’s disability plan, it failed to clearly state what bridged the gap 
between risk of relapse and actual dependence—making both conditions equal to a 
current disability under an ERISA long-term disability benefits plan.222  The First 
Circuit should not have explicitly stated that the risk of relapse was not a sickness 
included in the disability plan.  Instead the Court should have discussed how the 
risk of relapse constituted a current disability like substance dependence, even 
though it was not written in the disability plan.  
During the arbitrary and capricious calculus, the First Circuit explained that 
the occupation test considered substance dependence to be a sickness, which could 
afford benefits.223  However, the Court did not state that within the plan’s 
occupation test, a risk of relapse into substance dependence was defined as a 
sickness that could afford benefits.224  The opinion merely discussed what factors 
were to be considered to meet the standard for the plan’s occupation test.225  Then, 
the Court held that the plaintiff’s risk of relapse met the standard for the plan’s 
occupation test.226  In light of the occupation test, the plaintiff’s risk of relapse was 
so high that the plaintiff was unable to complete one or more of the material duties 
of her occupation, as a physician.227  
In relying on medical expertise, the First Circuit explained that Dr. Colby 
experienced a significantly high risk of relapse into substance dependence.228  
Therefore it acknowledged that the level of risk was important.229  Yet, in its 
opinion the Court did not explicitly state whether there was an actual range of risk 
level, and if this range could have an effect on the disability benefits 
determination.230  The First Circuit should have specifically explained how courts 
 
 220. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 221. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.  
 222. Colby III, 705 F.3d at 62 (showing the court’s analysis did not address how the risk of 
relapse, which is not included in the plan’s language as a disability, can be seen as an actual 
addiction to substance abuse, which is included in the plan’s language as a disability deserving of 
long-term disability benefits).   
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. (noting that under the definition of “sickness” contained in the plan, substance 
abuse, dependence, and addiction may be covered).   
 225. See id. (discussing the factors of the occupation test, which relate to the plaintiff’s ability 
to work full-time). 
 226. Id. at 60. 
 227. See id. at 64 (explaining that the material duties of the plaintiff’s occupation include: 
working full-time as an anesthesiologist with access to the drug of her choice, Fentanyl).  
 228. Id.  
 229. See id. (noting that Dr. Colby’s risk of relapse was significantly high). 
 230. See id. (discussing various expert’s opinions on the level of Dr. Colby’s risk of relapse 
into substance abuse). 
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should use the evidence from medical experts to determine whether a plaintiff is 
likely to risk relapse into substance abuse, and if there is a range of risk level.  
The First Circuit could have referred to the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) for guidance on this issue.231  
The DSM-5 features the “standard classification of mental disorders used by mental 
health professionals in the United States.”232  The purpose of the DSM-5 is to “be 
used by a wide range of health and mental health professionals, including 
psychiatrists and other physicians, psychologists, social workers, nurses, 
occupational and rehabilitation therapists, and counselors.”233  
The First Circuit could have searched for “Opioid Use Disorders”234 to get a 
better understanding of whether the risk of relapse into substance use dependence 
could be defined as an active substance use dependence, for purposes of receiving 
disability benefits under and ERISA plan.235  Realistically, a risk and an active 
disorder are not the same thing, but in the context of a disability plan, the definition 
of these two conditions may be the same.236  Yet, the DSM-5 finds that “individuals 
with opioid use disorder often develop conditioned responses to drug-related 
stimuli,” and that  “these responses probably contribute to relapse, are difficult to 
distinguish, and typically persist long after detoxification is completed.”237  Since 
the DSM-5 reveals that a risk of relapse is a condition that persists, it can be clearly 
argued that the risk is active and thus, a current disability.238  
Second, the First Circuit did not indicate whether reviewing courts should 
find that the risk of relapse into substance abuse is the same as a risk of relapse into 
a mental illness or physical illness.239  The Court should have addressed the Fourth 
Circuit’s comparison between a risk of relapse into substance use and the 
likelihood of a reoccurring heart attack.240  The Fourth Circuit stated that “whether 
[the plaintiff] succumbs to that temptation [of relapsing into substance abuse] 
remains his choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such choice.”241  The 
Fourth Circuit determined that the risk of relapse into substance abuse was not the 
 
 231. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS, DSM-5, (5th ed. 2013). 
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2013). 
 233. Id.  
 234. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (indicating that Dr. Colby had dependence 
issues with Fentanyl, an opioid). 
 235. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 234, at 541.. 
 236. See Colby III, 705 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining that the disability plan’s 
occupation test covers injury and sickness, which pertain to current disabilities not future risks).   
 237. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 234, at 542. 
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 239. See infra notes 240–44 and accompanying text.  
 240. Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 2008).  
 241. Id. at 358. 
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same as the risk of recurrence of a heart attack.242  In its holding, the Fourth Circuit 
asserted that the individual facing a risk of relapse into substance abuse has a 
choice to make, where the individual facing a risk of another heart attack has no 
choice.243  In Stanford, the Fourth Circuit’s comparison was not grounded in expert 
medical evidence.244  
Reviewing courts should refer to expert medical testimony in making 
determinations that concern medical conditions.  Medical research shows that 
individuals facing a risk of relapse into substance abuse do not have a choice in 
succumbing to temptation, as the Fourth Circuit states.245  Research on addiction 
shows that substance abuse “alter[s] brain regions that control decision-making and 
judgment.”246  Dr. Nora D. Volkow, a physician who specializes in treating 
addiction, explains that repeated substance use affects the brain’s functioning, 
control, and choice.247  Dr. Volkow states that, “[d]rug addiction is insidious 
because it affects the very brain areas that people need to ‘think straight,’ apply 
good judgment and make good decisions for their lives.”248  Since this medical 
research reveals that individuals that risk relapse into substance dependence do not 
have a choice, it can be contended that the risk of relapse is like the risk of 
recurrence of a heart attack.249  Thus, courts can contend that the risk of relapse into 
substance abuse is the same as a risk of relapse into a physical illness, and is 
deserving of disability benefits under any circumstance.250  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit determined that the risk of relapse into substance abuse was the same 
as a current disability under this ERISA long-term disability benefits plan.251  Yet, 
the Court did not address how reviewing courts should view the nature of the risk 
of relapse when determining if the risk is a current disability.252  The First Circuit 
should have clearly stated what bridged the gap between risk of relapse and actual 
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substance abuse.253  The Court should have specifically explained how courts 
should use the evidence from medical experts to determine whether a plaintiff is 
likely to risk relapse into substance abuse, and if there is a range of risk level. 
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